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ABSTRACT 
In this study, we examined India’s domestic support policies to understand their classification and 
measurement for the purposes of official World Trade Organization (WTO) notifications. We then 
employed the underlying methods to prepare shadow notifications of India’s domestic support for 1998-
2005. Following that, we explored alternative support-definition scenarios and their possible effects on 
shadow notifications. Preliminary support estimates for 2006-2007 and a projection for 2015 are also 
provided with a discussion on how the latest WTO (2008) draft modalities are likely to impact India’s 
domestic support. 
India’s official notifications began in 1995 with green box support of nearly US$2 billion and 
limited use of special and differential treatment. The product-specific aggregate measure of support 
(AMS) was negative because external reference prices were larger than minimum support prices. 
Nonproduct-specific AMS, by way of fertilizer, electricity, irrigation, credit, and seed subsidies, 
accounted for about 7 percent of the value of agricultural production in 1995. In subsequent notifications, 
for 1996 and 1997, several key changes were observed. The first was the transfer of 80 percent of 
fertilizer, irrigation, and electricity subsidies from nonproduct-specific AMS to special and differential 
treatment of low-income and resource-poor farmers. Product-specific AMS remained negative, but the 
value of production was replaced by eligible production, which was set equal to quantities procured by 
public agencies in 1996 and 1997. Shadow notifications, based on our understanding of the underlying 
methods, showed that green box support had grown to nearly US$8.0 billion in 2005. Estimates of input 
subsidies to low-income and resource-poor producers declined between 1998 and 2002, but they 
amounted to about US$4.5 billion or 4 percent of the value of agricultural production in 2005. Product-
specific AMS remained negative through 2005 mostly because of the wide gap between external 
reference prices and minimum support prices. Nonproduct-specific AMS accounted for about 1 percent of 
the annual value of agricultural production for 1998-2005. Alternative support-definition and 
measurement scenarios showed a possible increase in product-specific AMS. However, reallocating input 
subsidies from special and differential treatment to nonproduct-specific AMS would only eliminate some 
of the slack in the latter’s de minimis exemption.  
With India’s general elections expected in early 2009, the immediate future includes popular 
policies such as credit subsidies and significant growth in minimum support prices. Nevertheless, non-
product-specific AMS would not likely exceed the limits proposed in the Doha Round (that is, 10 percent 
of value of production) even with popular policies. However, product-specific AMS would turn positive, 
especially in cereals, with high growth in support prices and the appreciation of Rupee as seen in recent 
years. Projections for 2015 suggest that de minimis exemptions would be about US$16 billion each for 
product-specific and non-product-specific AMS, giving India ample flexibility in domestic support 
policies. 
Keywords: India agricultural support policies; WTO Doha Round; notification of domestic 
support; WTO compliance    1
1.  INTRODUCTION AND AN OVERVIEW OF INDIA’S FARM POLICIES 
The objective of this study is to update domestic support (DS) notifications of India and place them in the 
context of the Doha proposals for further reform. We refer to the former as shadow notifications since 
officially India last notified its DS to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for 1997-1998. Our shadow 
notifications provide updates on DS measures and their components from 1998-1999 through 2005-2006. 
Preliminary estimates of shadow support are provided for 2006-2008 along with a projection of major 
support aggregates for 2015-2016. 
India is a large country from both population and economic viewpoints. The latest world 
development indicators of the World Bank rank India as the second largest country, population wise, and 
as the 10th largest in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). Table 1a presents India’s GDP in local 
currency and U.S. dollars from 1995-1996 through 2005-2006. It shows that India is not only a large but 
also a rapidly growing economy. As observed in the history of most high-income economies, 
agriculture’s share of India’s GDP has declined during the last two decades. However, the decline in 
agriculture’s share of GDP is not matched by that of its employment share (Table 1b). Around the time of 
India’s major trade reforms (1991-1992), agriculture accounted for 65.3 percent of total employment. In 
the latest period for which we have data (2004-2005) that share had fallen to only 58.5 percent. 
Agriculture remains the major source of income to a large share of the Indian population especially in the 
rural areas. 
Following independence in 1947, India’s agricultural policy objective has been to achieve self-
sufficiency in agricultural production (Pursell, Gulati, and Gupta 2007). The latter appears to have been 
attained mostly in staples, but demand has outpaced domestic supply in at least two commodities. Table 
2a shows declining importance of agriculture as a source of India’s exports since 1995. Except for meat 
products, none of the major agricultural exports shows a clear upward or downward trend. The sporadic 
nature of agricultural exports appears coincidental with domestic supply conditions, especially the 
monsoons. Export spikes in good crop years and vice versa likely reflect the underlying self-sufficiency 
objective. However, Table 2b shows that pulses and vegetable oils account for a majority of agricultural 
imports signaling unmet objectives in the self-sufficiency policy regime. 
Table 1a. India’s GDP and major components 
Source: Government of India (New Delhi: Central Statistical Organisation, various years) 
     Gross Domestic Product Share (%) 





Billion US$  
Agriculture,  




          
1995-1996 1,083,289  323.9  26.5  24.3  27.8 
1996-1997 1,260,710  355.1  27.4  25.3  27.0 
1997-1998 1,401,934  377.2  26.1  23.9  26.8 
1998-1999 1,616,082  384.1  26.0  23.9  26.1 
1999-2000 1,786,526  412.3  25.0  22.9  25.3 
2000-2001 1,925,415  421.5  23.4  21.2  26.2 
2001-2002 2,100,187  440.4  23.2  21.1  25.3 
2002-2003 2,265,304  468.1  20.9  18.8  26.4 
2003-2004 2,549,418  554.8  20.9  19.0  26.1 
2004-2005 2,855,933  635.6  18.8  17.0  27.5 
2005-2006 3,250,932  734.3  18.3  16.5  27.6 
          
Average  2,008,702 464  23.3  21.3  26.6   2
Table 1b. India’s employment and major components 
 Total 
Employment 
Employment Share (%) 
 (millions)  Agriculture, 
Forestry & Fishing 
Industry Private  Sector 
        
1992-1993 355.8  65.3  14.6  -- 
1993-1994 372.1  63.9  14.9  91.8 
        
1999-2000 396.8  61.7  15.8  94.0 
2000-2001 411.5  59.3  18.2  94.4 
2001-2002 428.2  60.8  17.1  94.6 
        
2004-2005 459.1  58.5  18.2  96.6 
  
Source: Government of India (New Delhi: National Sample Survey Organisation, various years).  
Note: Data are not available for every year because the National Sample Survey Organisation does not conduct annual surveys. 
Agriculture’s importance, for both self-sufficiency and employment objectives, has made India 
less enthusiastic in its approach to trade reform in the WTO context (Hoda and Gulati 2007). At the time 
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) India agreed to outline its policies on market 
access, DS, and export subsidies. However, India excluded itself from reduction commitments on at least 
two of the three pillars (market access and DS) citing a balance-of-payments exemption.  
In the case of market access, India had maintained a two-tier strategy of protection from imports 
leading up to the Uruguay Round (Pursell, Gulati, and Gupta 2007). The first tier involves the licensing of 
and quantitative restrictions on imports of most products including nonagricultural goods. Gulati and 
Pursell (1993) indicated that nearly 96 percent of tariff lines faced quantitative restrictions in India prior 
to 1990. In addition to the quantitative restrictions, India maintained high tariffs in the form of three types 
of import duties: basic customs, auxiliary, and additional. Hoda and Gulati (2007) noted that the basic 
customs duty has been as high as 200 percent, while the auxiliary duty ranged between 40 and 50 percent. 
The list of products with quantitative restrictions significantly overlapped with that of products facing 
high tariffs, but there were notable exceptions in the latter (for example, rice, maize, and milk products).1   
Given the balance-of-payments exemption, India agreed as part of the AOA to bind tariff rates for 
commodities that were not bound in earlier negotiations. The ceiling is set at 100, 150, and 300 percent 
for commodities, processed products, and edible oils, respectively. For those commodities with bound 
rates from earlier negotiations, pre-1994 tariff levels are retained. Interestingly, the latter group included 
some key cereals (rice, maize) and milk products at zero tariffs. The improvement in foreign exchange 
reserves in the late 1990s eliminated the balance-of-payments justification for quantitative restrictions 
forcing India to renegotiate bound rates for rice, maize, sorghum, milk and milk products, and a few other 
commodities in 1999. The newly negotiated tariffs, in the range of 40 to 80 percent, included minimum 
market access in the form of tariff-rate quotas. Hoda and Gulati (2007) reported that the simple average of 
applied customs duty on agricultural products was 37.0 percent in 2004, while the bound rates averaged 
114.8 percent. 
 
                                                      
1 See Purcell, Gulati, and Gupta (2007) for measures of nominal and effective rates of protection in Indian agriculture. 
Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005) provided producer support estimates for 1985-2002.   3
Table 2a. India’s total and major agricultural exports 
  Total Exports  Agriculture’s   Share of Agricultural Exports (percent) 










                
1995-1996  31,842  19.2  22.3 1.8  17.0  7.2  16.5 15.1  3.4 
1996-1997  33,498  20.5  13.0 2.9  15.0  6.6  16.4 16.9  3.4 
1997-1998  35,049  18.9  13.7 0.0  20.2  8.0  18.2 16.3  3.8 
1998-1999  33,211  18.2  24.7 0.0  22.2  7.0  17.2 10.3  3.5 
1999-2000  36,760  15.3  12.9 0.0  20.5  11.6  21.1 11.1  4.4 
2000-2001  44,147  13.6  10.7 1.5  16.8  8.7  23.3 11.0  6.9 
2001-2002  43,958  13.5  11.3 4.7  15.3  7.2  21.0 10.3  6.8 
2002-2003 52,823  12.7  18.0  5.4  13.2  6.9  21.3 6.5  6.4 
2003-2004  63,886  11.8  12.0 6.9  12.3  6.5  17.6 11.6  7.4 
2004-2005  83,502  10.1  17.8 3.8  12.6  7.9  17.0 11.2  8.9 
2005-2006 103,075  9.9  13.8 1.2  12.0  6.9  15.6 12.9  11.0 
                
Average  51,068  14.9  15.5 2.6  16.1  7.7  18.7 12.1  6.0 
Source: Government of India (Kolkata: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, various years) 

















Source:  Government of India (Kolkata: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, various years) 
  Total Imports  Agriculture's  Share of Agricultural Imports (%) 
  Million US$  Share (%)  Pulses  Vegetable Oils 
        
1995-1996 36,730  3.0  18.6  61.4 
1996-1997 39,165  3.5  18.3  60.2 
1997-1998 41,535  4.0  19.2  44.4 
1998-1999 42,379  6.5  6.1  65.4 
1999-2000 49,799  5.3  3.1  70.0 
2000-2001 50,056  3.4  6.5  77.7 
2001-2002 51,567  4.5  28.5  58.3 
2002-2003 61,533  4.4  21.0  67.4 
2003-2004 78,203  4.4  14.6  74.7 
2004-2005 111,472  3.2  11.2  70.1 
2005-2006 149,143  2.2  17.1  62.0 
        
Average 64,689  4.0  14.9  64.7   4
India had few export subsidies around the time of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. A 
primary reason for that is the elimination of a cash compensatory scheme (CCS) for exports as part of the 
1991 economic reforms. Prior to that time, the CCS provided cash incentives to exporters and also 
allowed for payment of marketing and freight costs of exporters. The other major export subsidy appears 
to be the income tax exemption of profits from exports. Because the latter did not figure in the export 
subsidy annex of the AOA, India has retained it in the post–Uruguay era. Although CCS has been 
eliminated, it remains as a justification for export subsidies to wheat and rice in 2002-2005, when the 
Food Corporation of India (FCI) took on large buffer stocks. 
With regard to DS, the two main instruments are the minimum support price (MSP) for major 
agricultural commodities and input subsidies provided to farmers in general. The former instrument has 
been used for most crops: for example, cereals, pulses, oilseeds, and commercial crops (sugarcane, cotton, 
tobacco, and jute). To ensure markets operate with MSP as the floor, procurement operations are carried 
out by public agencies. The FCI is authorized to procure wheat and paddy from farmers, and rice and 
sugar from millers. The latter is often referred to as a levy on millers, who part with a share of their 
production in return for a free hand in setting prices on the rest of their production. The decision on MSP 
is made by the Ministry of Agriculture with recommendations from the Commission on Agricultural 
Costs and Prices (CACP). Through the MSP, the CACP aims to cover the cost of production of each of 
the crops, including the imputed value of farm labor, and to provide a reasonable rate of return to farmers 
(Hoda and Gulati 2007; Pursell, Gulati, and Gupta 2007).  
Major inputs supplied at subsidized prices include fertilizer, electricity, irrigation, credit, and 
seeds (Gulati and Narayanan 2003). Fertilizer subsidy arises from ensuring a statutory retail price for 
farmers, which is lower than the per-unit domestic cost of production and the import price for nitrogenous 
and phosphatic fertilizers. In most years, the import price is lower than the domestic cost of production. In 
addition to the difference between the statutory retail price and the import price/domestic cost of 
production, the subsidy also covers the distribution costs of imported fertilizers. For domestic production 
of fertilizers, a retention price scheme establishes a fixed sales price for each nitrogenous and phosphatic 
fertilizer manufacturer. The sales price fixed for each manufacturing unit enables farmers to buy 
fertilizers at the statutory retail price. The government pays for the difference between the cost of 
production and the fixed sales price and a profit margin for each manufacturing unit.  
The computation of electricity subsidies appears complex because each Indian state has flexibility 
in choosing its policy for respective electricity boards or departments. As a result, wide regional variation 
exists in the nature and magnitude of electricity subsidies. The electricity tariff on agriculture is either 
zero or a fraction of the per-unit operating expenses of the electricity boards or departments. Similarly, 
farmers pay a fraction of the cost of irrigation infrastructure’s operating expenses. In both electricity and 
irrigation cases, the capital expenditure appears to be a direct allocation from central and state 
government budgets. Credit subsidy (that is, loan waivers or low interest rates for farmers on short-, 
intermediate- and long-term loans) also varies by state, but has not been as large as some of the above 
subsidies in recent years. Through national seed-testing labs and certification agencies, the Indian 
government has been providing poor farmers with seeds free of cost. Again, the value of seed subsidies is 
lower than that of the credit subsidies. 
The next section details the official DS notifications of India with our understanding of how 
every component of each of the DS tables is derived. We caution readers to interpret the information as 
our best guess of the underlying methodology of India’s DS notification. In the following section, we 
employ our understanding of the DS methodology from the last official notification (1997-1998) to sketch 
shadow notifications from 1998-1999 through 2005-2006. Finally, with preliminary estimates for 2006-
2008 and a projection for 2015-2016, we discuss how the WTO (2008) draft modalities on DS are likely 
to impact Indian DS policies and support measurements. We conclude with some insights on the future of 
Indian farm policy.   5
2.  INDIA’S OFFICIAL DOMESTIC SUPPORT NOTIFICATIONS, 1995-1997 
Official domestic support (DS) notifications of India for three years, 1995-1996, 1996-1997, and 1997-
1998, are presented in Table 3, which is taken from Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005). Note that the DS 
values in Table 3 are reported on a marketing-year (April-March) basis. Henceforth, we use the first 
calendar year to denote the entire marketing year for ease of reading; that is, 1995 denotes 1995-1996. 
The Reserve Bank of India’s annual average exchange rate appears to have been used in converting 
Indian rupees to U.S. dollars to notify support measures in the latter currency. 
The green box support, DS1 in official notifications, increased from US$2,195.6 to US$2,872.9 
million between 1995 and 1997. The primary item in DS1 is the central government’s budget expenditure 
related to food storage and warehousing (that is, public stockholding for food security, arising out of 
operations of the Food Corporation of India [FCI] and other agencies). On average from 1995 to 1997, 
stockholding accounted for 70 percent of the green box support. Other significant components include 
general services (mostly research) and relief from natural disasters or calamities, where the latter includes 
an emerging crop-insurance program. The DS1 notifications appear to have reported expenditures or 
budget outlays under each of the categories as envisioned in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA) Itemized expenditures on green box support are available from the budgetary documents of the 
Government of India’s Ministry of Agriculture for various years.  
Table 3. India’s official WTO domestic support notifications, 1995-1997 
 1995  1996  1997 
  US $ Million 
Green Box Payments       
General Services  397.6  239.3  264.6 
Public Stockholding for Food Security  1569.7  1708.7  2018.2 
Domestic Food Aid  …  …  … 
Decoupled Income Support  …  …  … 
Income Insurance and safety net programs  10.9  …  … 
Payments for relief from natural disasters  125.0  444.3  443.8 
Structural adjustment through producer retirement 
programs  … …  …… 
Structural adjustment through resource retirement programs  …  …  …… 
Structural adjustment through investment aids  59.2  36.3  76.1 
Environment payments  33.2  73.7  70.2 
Payments under regional assistance programs  …  …  … 
Other …  …  … 
Total 2195.6  2502.3  2872.9 
Special and Differential Treatment       
Investment subsidies generally available to agriculture  104.8  1117.3  1142.5 
Input subsidies to low income or resource poor producers  149.5  3737.8  4029.3 
Total 254.3  4855.1  5171.8 
Product Specific AMS       
Rice -7,577.0  -1,321.3  -1,479.9 
Wheat -9,625.0  -1,280.8  -1,266.4 
Coarse Cereals  -4,530.4  -1.5  -2.9 
Pulses -1,705.8  …  … 
Groundnut -1,809.3  …  …   6
Table 3. Continued 
 1995  1996  1997 
  US $ Million 
Product Specific AMS (continued)       
Rapeseed and mustard  -1,688.7  …  … 
Cotton -2,106.4  …  … 
Soya bean  -191.7  …  … 
Tobacco -181.4  …  … 
Jute -387.6  …  … 
Sugar cane  184.4  …  … 
Total -29,618.9  -2,603.6  -2,749.2 
Non-product Specific AMS       
Fertilizer subsidy  1,864.1  413.6  515.9 
Credit subsidy  102.0  …  … 
Subsidy on electricity  2,436.6  373.6  342.5 
Irrigation subsidy  1345.4  143.1  144.9 
Subsidy on average supply of seeds  23.9  0.1  0.1 
Total 5,772.1  930.3  1,003.5 
as % of value of production  7.5%  1.1%  1.2% 
Value of agricultural production  76,736.0  85,280.0  84,972.0 
Source: Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005) 
Support under special-and-differential-treatment exemptions of the AOA (that is, DS2) witnessed 
a dramatic increase in the 1995-1997 period. Table 3 shows that support increased from US$254.1 million 
in 1995 to US$4,855.1 (US$5,171.8) million in 1996 (1997). The latter appears to reflect changes in how 
fertilizer, electricity, and irrigation subsidies are apportioned between DS2 and DS9 notifications. Article 
6.2 of the AOA stated that “agricultural input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-
poor producers in developing country Members shall be exempt from DS reduction commitments that 
would otherwise be applicable to such measures….”  Unlike in 1995, India’s 1996 and 1997 DS2 
notifications appear to have included 80 percent of three input-subsidy categories under “input subsidies 
to low-income or resource poor producers”: fertilizer, electricity, and irrigation.  Consistent with our 
thesis, the notified input subsidies in DS9 dramatically declined from 1995 to 1996 and 1997 (Hoda and 
Gulati 2007). The chosen percentage (80) is from a survey by the Government of India published in the 
2000 issue of Agricultural Statistics at a Glance that showed that nearly 80 percent of farm holdings are 
less than two hectares. The other major items in DS2 are the investment subsidies generally available to 
agriculture, which increased from US$104.8 million in 1995 to US$1,142.5 million in 1997. The latter 
appears to be related to the expenditure of the Ministry of Rural Development, whose budget includes 
allocations for rural development, land resources, and drinking water supply. The proportions or 
components of the rural development budget included in the official notification are not clear, but the 
notified support is close to the sum of the allocations for rural development and land resources. 
Table 3 also has the product-specific aggregate measurements of support (AMS) for 11 
commodities in the 1995-1997 period, although minimum support prices (MSPs) are also announced for 
several subcategories of many of these crops. In 1995, India notified product-specific AMS in all 
commodities based on external reference prices (ERPs) from 1986 through1988. For DS7, the AMS 
appears to be the product of price difference (MSP minus ERP) and total production of the commodity in 
1995, when the notified product-specific AMS was -US$29,618.9 million. The latter is negative because 
ERP exceeded MSP in all commodities with the exception of sugar.  
There appears to have been at least two changes in AMS methodology in the notifications 
subsequent to 1995. The first is that the product-specific AMS is reported for only rice (including paddy), 
wheat, and coarse cereals in 1996 and 1997. Hoda and Gulati (2007) reasoned that this change is caused   7
by government agencies generally not procuring other commodities in large scale.
2  Furthermore, the total 
production in the formula for computing AMS seems to have been replaced by eligible production, which 
is the amount of commodity procured by public agencies such as the FCI. Because paddy, rice, and wheat 
are the most commonly procured commodities, India appears to have notified the product-specific AMS 
in those commodities only.
3  As a result, the notified product-specific AMS is -US$2,603.6 and -
US$2,749.2 million in 1996 and 1997 respectively. Hoda and Gulati (2007) detailed a number of 
concerns on India’s notification of product-specific AMS. The ERP may not have best represented India’s 
net trade position during the base years, especially for wheat, coarse cereals, pulses, and cotton. 
Furthermore the notified MSPs for wheat, groundnut, pulses, and cotton do not seem to match either the 
prevailing seasonal prices or the comparable quality in world markets. In addition, Hoda and Gulati 
(2007) questioned the use of eligible production against the total production, where the former assumed 
the applicability of MSPs to publicly procured quantities only. 
India’s notified nonproduct-specific AMS values in Table 3 have also changed between 1995 and 
the subsequent notifications. In 1995, it appears that the entire subsidy for fertilizer, electricity, irrigation, 
credit, and seeds, totaling US$5,772.1 million and accounting for 7.5 percent of the value of agricultural 
production, is notified as nonproduct-specific AMS. However, the reported estimates declined to 
US$930.3 and US$1003.5 million in 1996 and 1997, respectively, accounting for less than 2 percent of 
the value of agricultural production in either year. As noted earlier, the reason for this decline in notified 
support appears to have been the change in methodology that allocated about 80 percent of the fertilizer, 
electricity, and irrigation subsidies to DS2 (special and differential treatment, Article 6.2 of AOA, WTO, 
1994).  
For notification purposes, India appears to have used Gulati and Narayanan’s (2003) allocation of 
budgetary expenditures on fertilizer subsidies to the industry and to farmers. Their allocation attributed 
the price difference between domestic and international markets into a part that permitted the domestic 
production of fertilizers at a price above the world price, which is referred to as a subsidy to the industry. 
Twenty percent of the rest (that is, farmers’ share of subsidies) appears to have been reported in DS9 as 
fertilizer subsidies to large farm holdings. The notified electricity subsidy is from the Government of 
India Planning Commission’s Annual Report on the Working of State Electricity Boards and Electricity 
Departments (various issues). Again, 20 percent of the collective budgetary subvention received by states 
has been identified as the subsidy on electricity for DS9 purposes. With regard to irrigation subsidies, 
there is less certainty on the methods behind official notification. Hoda and Gulati (2007) suggested that 
the notified support is the difference between operating expenditure of the minor irrigation projects and 
fee receipts from farmers. With the latter being small, the entire operating expenses should translate into 
notified support. Surprisingly, the notified support is six to seven times that of the operating expenditure 
of minor irrigation projects. The notified support, however, appears to be about 20 percent of the entire 
budget for the Government of India Ministry of Water Resources (various years). 
Credit subsidies were not notified for 1996 and 1997, and Hoda and Gulati (2007) suggested that 
they are likely to be negligible in those years. Notified seed subsidies, which included the operating 
expenses of seed testing and certifying labs, have also become a smaller component of input subsidies. 
The decline in notified seed subsidies also appears to have been related to the apportioning of subsidies 
between DS2 and DS9. 
In the next section, we use the above DS methodology to replicate India’s official notification for 
1997 and outline the differences we encountered. Then, we used the same methodology as in the 
replication of the 1997 notification to extend each of the DS measures to 2005. 
                                                      
2 Procurement of other commodities (for example, sugar, cotton, jute, pulses) is mostly carried out by the Cotton/Jute 
Corporation of India and National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation.  
3 In 1999, procurement of cotton, mustard, and oilseeds was about 86,000, 250,000 and 60,000 tons, respectively 
(Government of India, Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, 2000).   8
3.  SHADOW NOTIFICATIONS, 1998-2005 
Table 4 summarizes the shadow domestic support (DS) components in 1997-2005 as in Table 3, while 
Tables 5 through 8 provide detailed DS measures in a format similar to that of the official World Trade 
Organization (WTO) notifications. As noted earlier, we computed DS measures for 1997 using our 
understanding of India’s official DS methodology before extending them to 2005. All data are expressed 
in U.S. dollars, where the Reserve Bank of India’s annual average exchange rate is used in converting 
Indian rupees to U.S. dollars. In the following discussion, we also point to discrepancies between our 
calculations and notified 1997 support wherever applicable. 
The subheadings of Table 4—green box payments (DS1), special and differential treatment 
(DS2), product-specific aggregate measurements of support (AMS) (DS4, DS5, and DS7), and 
nonproduct-specific AMS (DS9)—are taken from the official WTO notifications consistent with the 
language in the Annex of the AOA (Agreement on Agriculture), WTO (1994). Our estimate of the green 
box payments for 1997 is US$2,955.0 million, whereas the official notification is lower by US$82.1 
million (US$2,872.9) for a discrepancy of less than 3 percent of the notified support.
4  Our data for 
computing green box support come from a variety of sources. Budgetary outlays and their revisions are 
taken from the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy’s (CMIE) annual report titled Public Finance, 
which compiles data from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the Central Statistical Organisation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government 
of India. 
In most case, we cross-checked CMIE data with those available at the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Government of India, Agriculture Budget, various dates). It appears that we have overestimated the 
support for public stockholding and underestimated the rest. We suspect that revised budgetary 
expenditures published by the Indian government may be the source of the discrepancy. Based on our 
calculations, green box support increased from US$2,954.9 to US$7,689.3 million between 1997 and 
2005, a 161 percent increase relative to the 1997 level. Alternatively, green box support as a share of 
value of agricultural production doubled between 1997 (3.5 percent) and 2005 (6.9 percent). The share of 
public stockholding in green box support appears to have declined from 74 to 69 percent between 1997 
and 2005 while that of disaster payments has increased from 14 to 21%. Although the growth of 
environmental program payments is dramatic, its share of the green box support remains below 2 percent. 
Decoding the methodology of special and differential treatments has remained the key challenge 
in our study. The two major items of DS2 are, as noted before, (a) investment subsidies generally 
available to agriculture and (b) fertilizer, electricity, and irrigation subsidies. For the former, we employ 
the allocations for rural development and land resources in the budget of the Government of India, 
Ministry of Rural Development (various years). Based on the above calculations, support under item (a) 
above has increased from US$643.0 million in 1997 to US$5321.7 million in 2005. The official 
notification of item (a) for 1997 is $1,142.5 million, which is significantly different from our estimate. 
The estimate for 2005 is preliminary because revised budget estimates are not available at this time. It 
appears that investment subsidies increased from about 1 percent of value of agricultural production in 
1997 to nearly 5 percent in 2005.  
 
                                                      
4 For 1996, our discrepancy is only US$20.6 million, which is less than 1 percent of that year’s notified green-box support. 
The correspondence between WTO-DS components and Indian official documents can be obtained from the author on request.    9






















  US$ Millions 
Green Box Payments (DS1)           
General  Services    236.1 270.4 354.5 325.2 308.7 319.1 368.7 402.7 470.2 
Public  Stockholding  for  Food  Security    2,176.0 2,214.1 2,243.3 2,708.7 3,741.2 4,429.3 5,534.3 5,817.5 5,328.0 
Domestic  Food  Aid    - - - - - - - - - 
Decoupled  Income  Support    - - - - - - - - - 
Income  Insurance  and  Safety  Net    - - - - - - - - - 
Relief  from  Natural  Disasters    426.0 378.6 412.6 492.2 852.3 708.2 896.8 995.6  1,679.8 
S t r u c t u r a l   A d j u s t m e n t              
Producer  Retirement  Programs - - - - - - - - - 
Resource  Retirement  Programs - - - - - - - - - 
Investment  Aids 73.8 75.4 67.8 70.3 47.1 55.8 64.2 66.8 79.7 
Environment  Payments    43.0 40.3 45.9 54.4 60.0 77.6  100.0  105.1  131.6 
Regional  Assistance  Programs    - - - - - - - - - 
Other    - - - - - - - - - 
DS1 Total  2,954.9 2,978.7 3,124.0 3,650.8 5,009.3 5,589.9 6,964.0 7,387.8 7,689.3 
           
Special and Differential Treatment (DS2)         
Investments Subsidies Generally Available 
to Agriculture  
643.2  665.1 1,809.6 2,224.2 2,118.9 2,328.5 2,527.5 2,826.2  5,321.7
** 
Input Subsidies to Low Income or Resource 
Poor Producers  
4,013.6 3,956.1 3,584.3 3,290.5 3,049.8 3,754.3 3,848.2 4,311.6  4,466.6
** 
DS2 Total  4,656.8 4,621.2 5,393.9 5,514.7 5,168.7 6,082.8 6,375.7 7,137.8  9,788.3
** 
         
Product-Specific AMS (DS4, DS5, and DS7)         
Rice    -1,479.9 -1,330.9 -1,690.4 -2,024.4 -2,117.4 -1,509.7 -1,891.6 -1,866.1 -1,921.7 
Wheat    -1,178.8 -1,692.5 -1,835.0 -2,139.6 -2,760.3 -2,542.9 -2,004.9 -2,042.1 -2,261.5 
Coarse  Cereals    -2.8 - - - - - - - - 
Pulses    - - - - - - - - - 
Groundnut    - - - - - - - - - 
Rapeseed  and  Mustard    - - - - - - - - - 
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  US$ Millions
Cotton    - - - - - - - - - 
Soya  Bean    - - - - - - - - - 
Tobacco    - - - - - - - - - 
Jute    - - - - - - - - - 
Sugarcane    - - - - - - - - - 
DS4, DS5, and DS7 Total  -2,661.6 -3,023.4 -3,525.5 -4,163.9 -4,877.6 -4,052.6 -3,896.6 -3,908.3 -4,183.2 
           
Nonproduct-Specific AMS (DS9)           
Fertilizer  Subsidy    515.9 417.5 282.5 388.1 260.5 257.1 319.0 444.1 483.5 
Credit  Subsidy    - - - - - - - - - 
Electricity  Subsidy    342.6 492.1 519.9 326.9 364.0 537.0 482.3 466.4 522.3 
Irrigation  Subsidy    144.9  79.5  93.6 107.6 137.9 144.4 160.7 167.3 110.8 
Subsidy  on  Average  Supply  of  Seeds    0.1 - - - - - - - - 
DS9 Total  1,003.5 989.0  896.1  822.6 762.4 938.6  962.1  1,077.9  1,116.7 
           
Nonproduct-Specific AMS as % of Value 
of Production  
1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 
           
Value of Agricultural Production (Mil. 
US$) 
84,973 91,329 88,799 82,905 88,502 83,561 98,568  100,006  111,701 
           
Notes: *Our replication of the 1997-1998 WTO official notification, except for the irrigation subsidy (DS9). **Preliminary estimate. AMS is aggregate measurements of support. 
A – indicates either not reported or data unavailable.  11
Among the three major input subsidies appearing in item (b) of DS2, we have more precise 
information on fertilizer and electricity subsidies than on irrigation. The source of the budgetary fertilizer 
subsidy for 1998-2005 is the Agricultural Statistics at a Glance published by the Government of India 
(Ministry of Agriculture, various issues), and information on the farmer’s share of fertilizer subsidy is 
from the 2004 issue of the Central Government Subsidies in India (Government of India, Ministry of 
Finance, various issues). The data for the electricity subsidy, especially the subvention received by all 
states, are from various issues of the Annual Report on the Working of State Electricity Boards and 
Electricity Departments (Government of India, Planning Commission). We compute irrigation subsidies 
reported in DS2 as 80 percent of the budget of the Ministry of Water (Government of India, various 
years) resources.
5   Our estimates suggest that three subsidies have declined from US$3,956.1 million in 
1998 to US$3,049.8 million in 2001 before increasing to US$4,466.6 million in 2005. The total DS2 
support, as computed by our methods, remained near 6 percent of the value of production until 2004 but 
peaked in 2005 to nearly 9 percent. However, we suggest caution in interpreting the 2005 share because 
two major components (investment and irrigation subsidies) are based on preliminary estimates of 
budgetary expenditures.  
With regard to product-specific AMS, the 1997 methodology appears to be a direct product of the 
price difference (administered minus external reference prices) and eligible production. The Economic 
Survey of the Government of India’s Ministry of Finance reported stockholding of rice (including paddy), 
wheat and coarse cereals, which appear to coincide with eligible production in official notifications.
6  
Administered prices for 23 commodities (with more than one price depending on variety/quality for rice, 
soybean, cotton, tobacco, and copra) are obtained from Agricultural Statistics at a Glance published by 
the Government of India’s Ministry of Agriculture. The price of paddy is multiplied by 1.5 to arrive at the 
MSP of rice, and the common-grade price has been used in the official notifications of 1997. Our 
estimated 1997 rice AMS is identical to that reported in official notifications. However, we seem to have 
underestimated wheat AMS in absolute value for 1997, which may be related to how the bonus to the 
MSP is implemented. The data on bonuses are available, but information on the applicable time and 
quantity is limited. Nevertheless, the gap between our estimates and notified wheat AMS is -US$87.6 
million. Similar to the rice AMS, our estimated coarse-cereals AMS matched the notified support. 
Extending the above methodology to 1998-2005, we found that rice and wheat AMS values were negative 
in all years with mixed trends.
7  With little stockholding, coarse cereals drop out of the product-specific 
AMS computation. The negative difference between MSPs and ERPs has shown a tendency to narrow, 
but the eligible quantity has increased during 1998-2005, a theme we return to in section 3.3. 
The notified nonproduct-specific AMS in 1997 totaled US$1,003.5 million, 85 percent of which 
were fertilizer and electricity subsidies. Based on Agricultural Statistics at a Glance (Government of 
India, Ministry of Agriculture), the Central Government Subsidies in India (Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance 2004), and various issues of the Annual Report on the Working of State Electricity 
Boards and Electricity Departments (Government of India, Planning Commission), we derived the 20 
percent of the fertilizer and electricity subsidies reported in DS9. Our estimated fertilizer and electricity 
subsidies were identical to those notified by India in 1996 as well as 1997. As noted in the discussion of 
the shadow DS2 notification, the rest of the fertilizer and electricity subsidies appear to be classified 
under the exemption given to low-income or resource-poor farmers. The fertilizer subsidy has undergone 
some reforms, where the retention price scheme was applied to nitrogenous manufacturers only. Some of 
this change seems to be reflected in the decline of fertilizer subsidies until 2002. However, concessions 
for phosphatic manufacturers have dramatically increased in recent years causing total fertilizer subsidies 
to again increase (2003-2005). Electricity subsidies also show a mixed trend, but have increased from 
US$342.6 to US$522.3 million between 1997 and 2005. Irrigation subsidies have increased from 
                                                      
5 Budget figures were not readily available for 1997 to check for a discrepancy between our estimate of irrigation subsidies 
and the officially notified support (US$144.9 million, Table 3). 
6 In 2005, procurement of cotton, mustard, pulses, and oilseeds was about 230,000; 2,000,000; 108,000; and 100,000 tons, 
respectively. 
7 Product- and nonproduct-specific AMS in real and nominal terms until 1999 can be found in Hoda and Gulati (2007).   12
US$79.5 million to US$167.3 million in 2004 before declining to US$110.8 million in 2005 (Government 
of India, Ministry of Water Resources, various issues). The latter may change when the Government of 
India updates its budget expenditures. The nonproduct-specific AMS as a percent of the value of 
agricultural production remained near 1 percent in 1997-2005.
8 
Figure 1a shows the general trend of various measures of DS—green box, special and differential 
treatment (Article 6.2), product-specific AMS, and nonproduct-specific AMS—and the value of output in 
Indian agriculture from 1997 through 2005. Support under green box and special and differential 
treatment has shown significant growth, as noted earlier, while nonproduct-specific AMS remained 
somewhat constant. Product-specific AMS has remained negative, but with a mixed trend in the 1997-
2005 period. Share of various measures of DS in value of output is shown in figure 1b. The growth in the 
value of output in figure 1a as well as shares of product-specific and nonproduct-specific AMS in figure 
1b show the flexibilities available to India under both de minimis provisions (10 percent).  
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8 The value of production from the Government of India, Central Statistical Organisation matched the notified amount in 
1996 and 1997.   13
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3.1. Shadow Green Box (DS1) 
Our estimated green box support with details on each of the major components, noted earlier, is provided 
in Table 5. Expenditure on general services—research, pest and disease control, command area 
(irrigation) development program, and marketing and promotion services—doubled between 1997 and 
2005. Among them, research accounted for the majority of support, and more than doubled from 
US$184.5 to US$404.8 million. Marketing and promotion services saw significant growth from 1997 to 
2005, but their share of general services has remained well below 5 percent. 
Public stockholding expenditure in 2005, mostly due to procurement, storage, and warehousing of 
rice (including paddy), wheat, and coarse cereals, was about 2.6 times of that in 1997. It appears that 
much of the growth can be attributed to the near doubling of rice and wheat procurement between 1997 
and 2005, as will be shown in section 3.3.
9  The strain on the exchequer was especially evident since 
2001. The second largest expenditure in the green box support is the payments, including those for crop 
insurance, for relief from natural calamities. The latter has grown from US$426.0 to US$1,679.7 million 
over the period 1997-2005. Expenditure under structural adjustment has remained near US$70 million, 
but that of environmental programs has increased from US$43.0 to US$131.6 million between 1997 and 
2005. However, these two programs account for less than 3 percent of the green box support. In sum, 
green box support appears to have increased from US$2,955.0 million in 1997 to US$7,689.3 million in 
2005. Given minor differences between our estimates and the official notifications of 1996 and 1997, we 
expect discrepancies in the range of 1 to 3 percent in the estimates for 1997-2005. 
                                                      
9 The eligible production in the computation of product-specific AMS is the procurement by public agencies (e.g., Food 
Corporation of India).   14






















  Million US$ 
a. General Services            
(i)  Research  184.5 228.4 300.9 276.7 267.1 268.4 312.5 353.4 404.8 
(ii)  Pest  &  Disease  Control  9.5 5.9 7.6 7.8 6.4 6.5 3.5 5.9 7.3 
(iii)  Training  Services  - - - - - - - - - 
(iv)  Extension  &  Advisory  Services  - - - - - - - - - 
(v)  Command  Area  Development  Program  36.4 30.9 40.8 35.4 25.1 23.9 33.3 12.3 31.7 
(vi)  Marketing  &  Promotion  Services  5.7  5.2  5.2  5.3 10.1 20.3 19.3 31.1 26.5 
(vii)  Inspection  Services  - - - - - - - - - 
(viii)  Provision  for  Livestock  Health  Facilities  - - - - - - - - - 
(ix)  Infrastructural  Services  - - - - - - - - - 
General Services Total  236.1 270.4 354.5 325.2 308.7 319.1 368.7 402.7 470.2 
            
b. Public Stockholding for Food Security            
Buffer Stock Operations (food grain & sugar)  2,176.0 2,214.1 2,243.3 2,708.7 3,741.2 4,429.3 5,534.3 5,817.5 5,328.0 
            
c. Domestic Aid  - - - - - - - - - 
            
d. Relief from Natural Disasters            
(i)  Crop  Insurance  Scheme  29.6 26.1 48.1 63.3 65.9 62.0  155.5 95.9  187.2 
(ii)  Scarcity  Relief  and  Natural  Calamities  396.4 352.4 364.5 428.9 786.4 646.2 741.3 899.7  1,492.5 
Relief Total  426.0 378.6 412.6 492.2 852.3 708.2 896.8 995.6  1,679.7 
            
e. Structural Adjustment via Investment Aids            
(i)  Dry  Land  Farming/Rain-Fed  Farming  41.7  53.5  41.5  25.1 - - - - - 
(ii)  Reclamation  of  Alkaline  Soils  5.0 4.6 4.3 3.6 3.1 4.1  -  -  - 
(iii) Drought-Prone Area Program  27.1 17.4 21.9 41.6 43.9 51.7 64.2 66.8 79.7 
            
Investment Aids Total  73.8 75.4 67.8 70.3 47.1 55.8 64.2 66.8 79.7 
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  Million US$ 
f. Environmental Programs           
(i)  Soil  Conservation  in  Catchment  Areas    - - - - - - - - - 
(ii)  Integrated  Watershed  Management    - - - - - - - - - 
(iii)  Water  Harvesting  &  Soil  Conservation    - - - - - - - - - 
(iv)  National  Waste  Land  Development    - - - - - - - - - 
(v)  Desert  Development  Program  18.8 19.0 19.6 29.6 31.5 38.2 46.6 47.9 60.5 
(vi)  Control  of  Shifting  Cultivation  4.0 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.1 4.1 4.4 4.3 6.8 
(vii)  Forest  Conservation/Afforestation    20.1 17.7 22.8 21.6 25.4 35.2 49.1 53.0 64.3 
           
Environmental Programs Total  43.0 40.3 45.9 54.4 60.0 77.6  100.0  105.1  131.6 
           
Grand Total (Mil. US$)  2,955.0 2,978.7 3,124.0 3,650.8 5,009.3 5,589.9 6,964.0 7,387.8 7,689.3 
           
Note:
*Our replication of the 1997-1998 WTO official notification. 
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3.2. Shadow Notification of Special and Differential Treatment (DS2) 
In Table 6, the estimated DS2 support is presented. As noted earlier, the budget for rural development 
appears to be closest to the notified support under investment subsidies generally available to agriculture. 
Such investment subsidies showed moderate growth until 2004 but nearly doubled between 2004 and 
2005. The reported subsidies to low-income and resource-poor producers, documented under other input 
subsidies in DS2, item b, include 80 percent of the fertilizer, electricity, and irrigation subsidies. Item b of 
DS2 has shown a decline until 2001, but began increasing again matching the trend of concessions to 
phosphatic manufacturers. The total DS2 support is about 5 percent of the value of agricultural production 
until 2005, but jumps to nearly 9 percent in 2005 due to the increase in budgeted investment subsidies. 
The 2005 budget numbers are likely to be revised and hence, there is less confidence on the extent of 
growth in DS2 support for the latest year. 
3.3. Shadow Product-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support (DS4, DS5, and DS7) 
The components of product-specific AMS are presented in Table 7: ERPs in 1986-1988 averages, 
administered prices in MSP, and eligible production are included. For a discussion of the rationale 
underlying ERP and possible inconsistencies, see Hoda and Gulati (2007). During the base period for 
external reference prices, India was a net importer of rice, wheat, pulses, rapeseed, and sugar, and it was a 
net exporter in other crops with MSPs. The MSPs are taken from various years of the Agricultural 
Statistics at a Glance from the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture, while eligible production is 
from the Economic Survey (Government of India, Ministry of Finance). The MSPs are converted into 
U.S. dollars using the annual average exchange rate published by the Reserve Bank of India. In Table 7, 
the MSP included the bonus. 
As noted earlier, our estimated product-specific AMS for 1997 (-US$2,661.6 million) is higher 
than the notified amount (-US$2,749.2 million). In subsequent years, the primary reason for negative 
product-specific AMS values of commodities appears to be the higher ERP relative to MSP in all 
commodities except sugar. Inflation and political forces have led to increases in the MSP, which has 
resulted in a narrowing of the price gap especially in pulses and soybeans. For other crops as well, the 
price gap has narrowed, but it might take another decade or so before inflation and other factors bring 
about a positive wedge between MSP and ERP. So, the decrease in shadow product-specific AMS is the 
product of a narrowing, but negative, price gap and increasing stocks of public agencies. The concern on 
the use of eligible production versus total production is likely moot so long as the current negative price 
gap holds true. Hoda and Gulati (2007) question the use of eligible production in presenting a set of 
revised MSPs and ERPs, where positive (nominal) price gaps are observed for wheat, coarse cereals, 
groundnut, and rapeseed.  
3.4. Shadow Nonproduct-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support (DS9) 
The four major forms of nonproduct-specific AMS values are shown in Table 8. The budgetary 
expenditures on fertilizer and electricity subsidies were taken from various issues of Agricultural 
Statistics at a Glance (Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture, various years). For computing the 
fertilizer component of the nonproduct-specific AMS, the farmers’ share of these subsidies are computed 
using Gulati and Narayanan’s (2003) approach, which is reported in the Central Government Subsidies in 
India (Government of India, Ministry of Finance 2004). Data on farmers’ share has not been updated 
since 2002, and so, we used its 1981-2002 average for 2003-2005. Then, 20 percent of the farmers’ share 
of fertilizer subsidies applying to large farm holdings is reported in DS9, while the rest, 80 percent, is 
reported in DS2 under subsidies to low-income and resource-poor producers. For both 1996 and 1997, our 
methodology yields the notified level of fertilizer subsidies. Although the budgetary expenditures on 
fertilizer subsidies in rupee terms nearly doubled, the depreciation of the Indian rupee ensured its 
moderate decline, in U.S. dollar terms, until 2003. However, an increase is observed since 2004. Since   17
farmers’ share averaged nearly 60 percent in 1981-2002, a similar trend is observed in shadow estimates 
of fertilizer subsidies in DS9.  
The electricity-subsidy expenditure also doubled in rupee terms, but between 1997 and 2003 and 
since then it has shown a modest decline. Combined with the rupee depreciation, the shadow notifications 
of electricity subsidy showed a mixed trend. The budget of Ministry of Water Resources also doubled 
between 1998 and 2001. Following modest increases until 2004, the preliminary 2005 budget shows a 
decline in expenditure. Despite the depreciating rupee, the irrigation subsidies showed an increasing trend 
until 2004 in Table 8. The seed subsidies are reported in the Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 
(Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture, various years). However, the Government of India’s 
notification method for seed subsidies is not clear at this time.  
   18






















  Million US$ 
a. Investment Subsidies to Agriculture            
(i)  On  Farm  Developmental  Work    643.2  665.1 1,809.6 2,224.2 2,118.9 2,328.5 2,527.5 2,826.2  5,321.7
** 
(ii)  Loan  Under  Coffee  Development  Plan  2.5 - - - - - - -  - 
(iii)  Subsidies  for  Asset  Formation  1.4 - - - - - - -  - 
            
Investment Subsidies Total  647.1  665.1 1,809.6 2,224.2 2,118.9 2,328.5 2,527.5 2,826.2  5,321.7
** 
            
b. Input Subsidies to Low Income or Resource 
Poor Farmers 
          
(i)  Small  Farmer  Development  Assistance  15.0 - - - - - - -  - 
(ii)  Other  Input  Subsidies            
80% of the Fertilizer, Electricity, and Irrigation 
Subsidies
** 
4,013.6 3,956.1 3,584.3 3,290.5 3,049.8 3,754.3 3,848.2 4,311.6  4,466.6 
(iii) Grant-in-aid for Production of Planting 
Material of Cardamom  
0.0 - - - - - - -  - 
(iv) Program for Replanting of Senile and 
Uneconomic Cardamom Gardens 
0.2 - - - - - - -  - 
(v) Grant-in-aid for Postharvest Development of 
Spices 
0.1 - - - - - - -  - 
            
Poor Farmers’ Input Subsidies Total  4,028.9 3,956.1 3,584.3 3,290.5 3,049.8 3,754.3 3,848.2 4,311.6  4,466.6 
            
Grand Total (Mil. US$)  4,676.0  4,621.2 5,393.9 5,514.7 5,168.7 6,082.8 6,375.7 7,137.8  9,788.3
** 
            
Notes: *Our replication of the 1997-98 WTO official notification, except for the irrigation subsidy (DS9).  
**Preliminary estimate.   19
Table 7. Shadow notifications of product-specific aggregate measurements of support (DS4, DS5, and DS7) 





















            
   Applied Administered Price ($/ton)
Rice    262.5  167.5 156.9 169.6 167.5 166.7 170.5 179.5 187.0 193.1 
Wheat    264.0  137.2 130.7 133.9 133.5 130.0 130.2 137.1 142.4 146.8 
Coarse Cereals   238.6  96.9  92.7  95.8  97.4  101.7  101.2  109.9  114.6  118.6 
Pulses    345.7   224.3 249.8 258.3 270.9 268.8 304.7 318.7 334.8 
Groundnut    514.6   247.2 266.6 267.1 281.0 284.1 304.7 333.9 343.3 
Rapeseed  and  Mustard    513.4   237.7 253.9 262.7 272.6 276.9 348.2 378.4 387.4 
Cotton    1,292.6    342.3 363.5 355.7 351.2 350.2 375.4 391.7 397.6 
Soybean    229.8    178.3 184.6 179.5 176.1 175.6 192.6 211.4 215.7 
Tobacco   912.8    570.5 600.0 591.1 587.1 599.2 696.4 734.5 745.4 
Jute    417.6    154.5 173.1 171.8 169.8 175.6 187.2 198.1 205.6 
Sugarcane    11.6   12.5 12.9 13.0 13.0 14.4 15.9 16.6 18.0 
             
    Eligible Production (Mil. Tonnes) 
Rice      15.6 12.6 18.2 21.3 22.1 16.4 22.8 24.7 27.7 
Wheat      9.3 12.7 14.1 16.4 20.6 19.0 15.8 16.8 14.8 
All Other Commodities
**    0.0 - - - - - - - - 
             
   Product-Specific AMS (Mil. US$) 
Rice      -1,479.9 -1,330.9 -1,690.4 -2,024.4 -2,117.4 -1,509.7 -1,891.6 -1,866.1 -1,921.7 
Wheat     -1,178.8  -1,692.5  -1,835.0  -2,139.6  -2,760.3 -2,542.9 -2,004.9 -2,042.1 -2,261.5 
All Other Commodities
**    -2.8 - - - - - - - - 
             
Total AMS (Mil. US$)    -2,661.6 -3,023.4 -3,525.5 -4,163.9 -4,877.6 -4,052.6 -3,896.6 -3,908.3 -4,183.2 
             
             
              
Notes: *Our replication of the 1997-1998 WTO official notification, except for the irrigation subsidy (DS9).  
**Includes coarse cereals, pulses, groundnut, rapeseed and mustard, cotton, soybean, tobacco, jute, and sugarcane.   20
Table 8. Shadow notifications of non-product-specific aggregate measurements of support (DS9)  



















   
Fertilizer Subsidy           
Budgetary  Outlays  (Rs  Crores)  9,918  11,596 13244 13800 12595 11015 11847 16127 17298 
Budgetary  Outlay  (Mil.  US$)  2,580  2,087 1413 1941 1303 1286 1595 2221 2418 




20% of Subsidies to Farmers (Mil. US$)
***  515.9 417.5 282.5 388.1 260.5 257.1 319.0 444.1 483.5 
           
Electricity Subsidy           
Subvention Received (Rs Crores)  6,365  10,352  11,265  7,465  8,680 12,996 11,081 10,478 11,576 
Subvention  Received  (Mil.  US$)  1,713 2,461 2,600 1,634 1,820 2,685 2,412 2,332 2,612 
20% of Subvention
***  342.6 492.1 519.9 326.9 364.0 537.0 482.3 466.4 522.3 
           
Irrigation Subsidy           
Water  Ministry  Budget  (Rs  Crores)   1,671.2 2,027.8 2,458.2 3,288.7 3,495.0 3,692.4 3,759.0 2,453.0 
Water  Ministry  Budget  (Mil.  US$)   397.3 468.0 538.1 689.6 722.1 803.6 836.6 554.1 
20%  of  Budget  144.9  79.5  93.6 107.6 137.9 144.4 160.7 167.3 110.8 
           
Subsidy on Supply of Seeds (Mil. US$)  0.1 - - - - - - - - 
           
Total Nonproduct-Specific AMS (Mil. US$)  1,003.5 989.0 896.1 822.6 762.4 938.6 962.1  1,077.9  1,116.7 
           
Value of Agricultural Production (Mil. US$)  84,973  91,329 88,799 82,905 88,502 83,561  98,568 100,006 111,701 
           
Nonproduct-Specific AMS as % of Value of 
Agricultural Production 
1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.1  1.0 
           
Notes: *Our replication of the 1997-1998 WTO official notification, except for the irrigation subsidy (DS9).  
**Average from 1981 through 2002.  
***Subsidy applicable to farms with two or more hectares and notified to WTO as nonproduct-specific AMS. The remaining 80% is reported in special and differential treatment, 
DS2, part b, section (ii): other input subsidies to low-income or resource poor farmers (Table 6). 21 
 
4.  ALTERNATIVE DOMESTIC SUPPORT-DEFINITION AND  
MEASUREMENT SCENARIOS 
In this section, we outline major issues on classification and measurement of domestic support (DS) with 
emphasis on how they may affect product- and nonproduct-specific aggregate measurements of support 
(AMS) and the de minimis levels. The latter is the de facto limit on domestic support because India does 
not have a total AMS commitment. 
•  With regard to green box support, India likely faces questions on the classification of the 
procurement, storage, and distribution costs of major staples (that is, rice/paddy, wheat). At 
present it is not clear how the above operations of the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and 
other public agencies are classified into food security and food aid for World Trade 
Organization (WTO) notifications. The primary purpose of the FCI and other procurement 
agencies is to support farmers at or near the farm gate, but they also are responsible, at least 
partly, for distribution of collected quantities to urban consumers.
10  The challenge lies in 
separating the expenditure of public agencies procuring food grains and other major crops 
into those attributable to food security, food aid, and marketing/transport costs of farmers. 
Then, any of these components not applicable under Article 6.2 of AOA (WTO, 1994) would 
likely find a place in nonproduct-specific AMS. Alternatively, procurement appears to be 
limited to a few staples, and hence, this support outside of Article 6.2 may alter the 
computation of product-specific AMS. Reported stockholding expenditure is about US$5.3 
billion and the transfer of part of that support to either product- or nonproduct-specific AMS 
may begin to cut the slack in the de minimis exemptions. 
•  There are several issues on DS2 support notification. The first is the transfer of the majority 
of fertilizer, electricity, and irrigation subsidies from DS9 into DS2. These subsidies are 
available to all farmers and they do not specifically target low-income or resource-poor 
producers. Additionally, the share (80 percent) is based on the number of farms with less than 
two hectares in production. However, the share of such small farms in cultivated land is less 
than 40 percent. A reallocation based on the latter share would transfer nearly US$2 billion 
into nonproduct- specific AMS, which, in turn, may increase to about 3 percent of the value 
of agricultural production. The issues in computing each of these input subsidies is discussed 
in the latter text. 
•  With regard to product-specific AMS, India appears to follow the methods outlined in Annex 
3 of the AOA (WTO, 1994). However, Hoda and Gulati (2007) questioned the use of publicly 
procured quantities as eligible production in the computation of product-specific AMS.
11  
Furthermore, they noted reporting errors in notified minimum support prices (MSPs) (for 
example, cotton, pulses, rice, and wheat) and external reference points (ERPs) (groundnut 
and sugarcane). Using a shadow exchange rate, Hoda and Gulati (2007) recomputed product-
specific AMS, which shows a positive gap between MSP and ERP in nominal terms for some 
commodities, but the negative gap seen in Table 7 persists in real terms. It is also not clear 
how the use of nationally announced prices, such as MSPs, match with the AOA Annex 3 
(WTO, 1994) that states that support be measured as close to the farm gate as possible. 
•  Academic economists appear to agree only with the notification of fertilizer subsidies among 
the three input subsidies. The attribution of fertilizer subsidies into that for industry and the 
                                                      
10 It is not clear if the costs of the public distribution system (domestic food aid) are included in the green box support. 
11 Other countries such as China and the Philippines also report procured quantities as eligible production. The Committee 
on Agriculture appears to have addressed the issue of eligible production in the case of Korea’s beef industry. The Korean case 
seems to deal with announced and actual procurement quantity but not the issue of total production versus procured quantities. In 
the Indian context, an additional issue to deal with is marketable production because many small and poor farmers do not 
participate in output markets. 22 
 
farmer is based on the methodology of Gulati and Narayanan (2003). However, significant 
issues remain in the computation of electricity, irrigation, credit, and seed subsidies. In the 
case of electricity and irrigation subsidies, Hoda and Gulati (2007) noted that notified support 
includes only operating expenses of electricity boards/departments and minor irrigation 
projects, respectively. The capital expenditures are not counted in the notified support in 
either of these two cases. In some ways, the irrigation subsidy is seriously underestimated 
because it excludes operating expenditures of major and medium irrigation projects. Mullen, 
Orden, and Gulati (2005) drew on Gulati and Narayanan (2003) to provide alternative 
estimates of all three major input subsidies until 2003. Our shadow notification takes into 
account all three types of irrigation projects, but the issue of apportioning input subsidies 
(budgetary expenditures) between DS2 and DS9 remains relevant. 
While the above issues of classification and notification are significant, their incorporation into 
notifications appears to have limited effects. In the case of product-specific AMS, the effect is not 
relevant because ERPs remain well above MSPs. Including some of the green box support as product-
specific support for rice and wheat may not close the gap between ERP and MSP, but revisions to ERP 
suggested by Hoda and Gulati (2007) may make the latter exceed the former. For nonproduct-specific 
AMS, the above alternative definitions and measurements might cut most of the slack in the de minimis 
exemption (10 percent of value of agricultural production) of India under the AOA. 23 
 
5.  DOHA MODALITIES AND INDIA’S DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
Because India did not have a total aggregate measurements of support (AMS) commitment, the de 
minimis exemptions served as limits to domestic support (DS) in the Uruguay Round. In the proposed 
Doha modalities (that is, the World Trade Organization’s [WTO] Revised Draft Modalities for 
Agriculture from May 2008) developing countries without a total AMS commitment are required to 
compile a base overall trade-distorting support (OTDS), but are exempt from reductions in OTDS and 
total AMS. It is not clear if product-specific AMS limits in paragraphs 27 to 29 of Doha modalities 
(WTO, 2008) are applicable to both groups of developing countries with and without a total AMS 
commitment. If product-specific AMS limits apply, it is not clear which of the three options to developing 
countries would be chosen by India. With negative product-specific AMS, option (a), to use the average 
of 1995-2000 or 1995-2004 data appears to severely limit administered price support. Option (b), to use 
two-times the product-specific de minimis level of the AOA (that is, 20 percent of the value of production 
of each commodity, WTO, 1994) may be binding because option (c) involves the annual bound total 
AMS, which is zero for India. For the purposes of this study, we assume India’s DS is again limited by de 
minimis levels only. 
Table 9 presents preliminary estimates of India’s DS for 2006-2007 and a projection of major 
aggregates for 2015. The latter year corresponds to the anticipated conclusion of the Doha round and the 
likely beginning of another round of trade negotiations. Our projection for 2015 is in nominal terms and 
based on the average annual growth rate of support in each category from 1995 through 2005,  except for 
product-specific AMS. For the latter, we provide three alternative projections for 2015. 
•  The green box expenditures may increase to nearly US$17.3 billion by 2015 for two reasons 
(Table 9). The first is the projected expenditure on public stockholding, which may increase 
to about US$12.0 billion by 2015 if current rates of growth are to be sustained. The second 
reason is that spending on relief from natural calamities/disasters is projected to be about 
US$3.9 billion in 2015. The proposed Doha modalities address green box criteria for both 
these components (Annex B of the WTO’s Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture 2008). In 
the case of the public stockholding, the costs of procurement from resource-poor or low-
income farmers and distribution to urban and rural poor can be listed in the green box. 
Whether or not all (projected) expenditures on public stockholding fit within this definition is 
unclear and require procurement statistics by type of farmer. For the disaster relief, a floor for 
production loss as a percent of average production in the preceding five or three years has not 
been defined for developing countries in Annex B of the latest draft modalities (World Trade 
Organization 2008). India is likely to define these components in line with Annex B, and 
hence, a majority of these two items’ expenditures probably remains in the green box. 24 
 

















  US$ Millions 
Green Box (DS1)  8,340  9,046    17,327  
Public Stockholding (Food Security)  5,771  6,251    11,839     
Disaster Relief  1,828  1,990    3,916     
Special and Differential Treatment (DS2): 
Other Input Subsidies
** 
4,540 4,616    5,262     
Product-Specific AMS (DS4-DS5-DS7)  -2,038  95    3927  1,202  459 
Nonproduct-Specific AMS (DS9)
*** 1,142  1,169    1,404    
10% of Value of Agricultural Production (de 
minimis) 
11,944 12,360    16,253     
Notes: *(a) Nominal values based on annual average growth rate in the 1995-2007 period; (b) nominal values based on the annual 
average growth rate for 1995-2005; (c) real terms after accounting for an excessive inflation rate of 3 percent per annum. 
**Projections for investment subsidies of DS2 are not made due to data limitations. 
***For DS9, growth rate for 1996-2005 is used because notified support classification and measurement changed (see Table 8) 
•  For DS2, we limit our projections to other input subsidies, which include 80 percent of the 
fertilizer, irrigation, and electricity subsidies. Again, in nominal terms, we expect these 
subsidies to contribute to nearly $5.3 billion of support in DS2 (Table 9). Similar to the 
discussion in the previous section, some of the DS2 support may be reallocated to DS9. 
•  Among these projections, the case of product-specific AMS is of serious concern. With price 
increases in the range of 10 to 25 percent between 2006 and 2007, and a one-time bonus for 
the latter year, the nominal gap between minimum support price (MSP) and external 
reference price (ERP) has become positive for rice in 2007. If prices were to increase by the 
average annual growth from 1995-2007 until 2015, we would expect to see positive product-
specific AMS in rice and wheat (about US$3.9 billion [projection a, Table 9]). For other 
commodities, product-specific AMS will likely be zero, which is consistent with the zero 
procurement reported in official notifications. If price growth for 1995-2005 is employed, 
product-specific AMS becomes lower (US$1.2 billion [projection b, Table 9]). If the 
alternative support-definition of the entire volume of production, as opposed to procured 
quantities, were to be used, nominal product-specific AMS may exceed the 10 percent de 
minimis level in 2015. The reasons for breaching the de minimis level is that India produces 
nearly 200 million tons of  food grains, which is about four to five times the procured 
quantities. Moreover, the product-specific AMS for other commodities considers 
procurement to be zero. The latter changes may lead to product-specific AMS exceeding 
US$16.3 billion, the projected 10 percent of value of production in 2015. Fortunately for 
India, the AOA has provisions for excessive inflation (Article 18.4, AOA). Hence, in real 
terms, the 2015 price gap between MSP and ERP is significantly lower than that in nominal 
terms if a 3 percent allowance is taken for excessive inflation (projection c, Table 9). 
Moreover, the proposed revision to Article 18.4 of the AOA (1994) in the latest 2008 Doha 
modalities considers difficulties faced by developing countries in computing AMS as a result 
of sudden and extraordinary increases in food prices relative to the fixed ERP. Finally, if 
product-specific AMS limits apply, the limit of 20 percent of the value of production of each 
commodity is not likely to be exceeded in rice or wheat according to our projection for 2015. 25 
 
•  Nonproduct-specific AMS is likely to remain around 1 percent of the value of agricultural 
production if India continues to use the concepts of 1997 notification (Table 9). Moving some 
of the DS2 support back to DS9 may increase the share to about 3 percent, well under the 
proposed Doha limits for India. The share may further increase by several percentage points 
if the current proposal to provide credit subsidies is fully implemented. The 2008-2009 
budget has allocated about US$15.0 billion to absorb the cost of waiving farm loans. Of that, 
US$12.5 billion is proposed for low-income and resource-poor producers (less than two 
hectares), while the rest is allocated to help reschedule loan terms to all farmers. It is also not 
clear, at this time, how the Government of India will apportion credit subsidies over either the 
past or next five years.
12    
•  In general, the de minimis exemptions are expected to provide substantial flexibility to India 
in its pursuit of DS policies. By 2015, the product- and nonproduct-specific AMS can be as 
much as $16.3 billion each. Some concerns exist on whether product-specific AMS limits 
apply and support may breach the de minimis levels, but it is hard to pin it down because of  
uncertainty on the use of eligible versus total production, how applied administered price is 
reported (as close to the farm gate as possible), and the definition of excessive inflation. 
                                                      
12 Hoda and Gulati (2007) calculate no-product-specific support to be nearly 7 percent of the value of agricultural 
production, which presumably includes some of the alternative support-definition and measurement issues detailed in the 
previous section. 26 
 
6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we broadly outlined India’s domestic support (DS) policies and our understanding of their 
classification and measurement for the purposes of official notifications. Then, we employed the methods 
underlying them, to the best of our knowledge, to prepare shadow notifications of India’s DS until 2005. 
Following that, we explored alternative support-definition scenarios and their effects on official 
notifications. Finally, we provide preliminary support estimates for 2006-2007 and a projection for 2015, 
when a new round of trade talks is anticipated, and we explore policy options for Indian agriculture. 
The official notifications began in 1995 with green box support of nearly US$2 billion, which 
accounted for 3 percent of the value of agricultural production. The special and differential treatment was 
sparsely employed in 1995. Because external reference prices (ERPs) (1986-1988 average) were larger 
than the administered or minimum support prices, product-specific aggregate measures of support (AMS), 
computed using total production, was negative for most commodities in 1995. Hence, total product-
specific AMS was also negative. Nonproduct-specific AMS, by way of fertilizer, electricity, irrigation, 
credit, and seed subsidies, accounted for 7 percent of the value of agricultural production in 1995. In 
subsequent notifications (1996 and 1997), several key changes were observed. The first is the transfer of 
80 percent of fertilizer, irrigation, and electricity subsidies from nonproduct-specific AMS to special and 
differential treatment. The reason for this move is that 80 percent of farm holdings have less than two 
hectares of cultivated land. Also, the special and differential treatment began to be a reported expenditure 
on rural development, especially the investment subsidies. In the case of product-specific AMS, the value 
of production was replaced by eligible production, which is set equal to quantities procured by public 
agencies in 1996 and 1997. Because many commodities were not procured by the central government, 
product-specific AMS was reported for cereals only. These changes did not much alter the green box 
support, but support under special and differential treatment has grown at the expense of nonproduct-
specific AMS. As a result, the latter fell to 1 percent of the value of agricultural production. 
With our understanding of the 1997 methodology, we prepared a set of shadow notifications for 
1998-2005. Our shadow notifications show that green box support has grown to nearly US$8 billion in 
2005, which translates into about 7 percent of the value of agricultural production. Two major reasons for 
the growth in the green box support are the public stockholding (food security) expenditures and relief 
payments for natural disasters. Both components have witnessed significant growth in the 1998-2005 
period. There was less clarity on the source of investment subsidies used in the notification of special and 
differential treatment exemptions. However, our shadow estimates of input subsidies to low-income and 
resource-poor producers show some decline between 1998 and 2002, but they have rebounded since. Such 
input subsidies amounted to about US$4.5 billion or 4 percent of the value of agricultural production in 
2005. Product-specific AMS remained negative through 2005 mostly because of the wide gap between 
ERPs and MSPs. Nonproduct-specific AMS, with the allocation of 80 percent of fertilizer, electricity, and 
irrigation subsidies under special and differential treatment, accounted for about 1 percent of the value of 
agricultural production. 
Alternative support-definition and measurement scenarios show a possible increase in product-
specific AMS. However, reallocating input subsidies from special and differential treatment to 
nonproduct-specific AMS would only eliminate some of the slack in the latter’s de minimis exemption. 
Preliminary estimates for 2006 and 2007 are made using the average annual growth rates for 1995-2005 
for green box, special and differential treatment, and nonproduct specific AMS values. The last of the 
three does not exceed the de minimis level provided for in the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) or 
2008 Doha modalities. For product-specific AMS, we have access to MSPs for 2006 and 2007. 
Interestingly, the announced MSPs for 2007 along with one-time bonuses for some commodities are 10 to 
25 percent higher than those for 2006. Along with the appreciation of the rupee, the gap between ERPs 
and MSPs has disappeared. For rice, product-specific AMS became positive in 2007. If computed with 
total production figures, rice product-specific AMS would be at least four times as large as that using 
eligible production. 27 
 
Looking at projections for 2015, the possible date for beginning a new round of trade 
negotiations, we expect the value of Indian agricultural production to be about US$163 billion. So, the de 
minimis exemptions allow up to US$32 to 33 billion in farm support. It appears that the projected de 
minimis exemptions would be about US$16.3 billion each for product-specific and nonproduct-specific 
AMS, giving India ample flexibility in setting and implementing DS policies. Given the current 
commodity-price boom, this is an excellent opportunity for India to possibly shift from trade-distorting 
(market access) policies to decoupled support and investments in sustainable development. Increases in 
tax revenues and experiences of other large countries (for example, China, Brazil) in implementing direct 
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